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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case N6. 890253-CA 
v. : 
JOHNNY WADE DRAWN, : Categoty No. 2 
Defendant-Defendant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-6-302 (1978). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989), 
as the appeal was transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme 
Court on May 2, 1989. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUSES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant's voluntary confession to 
committing the aggravated robbery obviates the need of this Court 
to address Points I and II of defendant's argument on appeal. 
2. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's 
motion to exclude the in-court identification of defendant by 
Micki Horn. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
finding that the State had made sufficient effort to compel the 
attendance of subpoenaed witnesses Rosemary Mar and Genora 
Marcellus, and by admitting their statements under Rule 804(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
4. Whether the imposition of a five year sentence for 
use of a firearm during the commission of felony, in addition to 
the sentence given defendant upon his conviction of aggravated 
robbery, constituted double jeopardy. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Johnny Wade Drawn, was charged with 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 6-7). 
Defendant was convicted as charged on January 13, 1989, 
following a jury trial, in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David S. 
Young, Judge, presiding (R. at 109). Defendant was sentenced by 
Judge Young on February 10, 1989, to five years to life at the 
Utah State Penitentiary, to be served consecutively with the 
sentences he was currently serving and with an additional five-
year firearm enhancement (R. at 114-15). 
A notice of appeal was filed on March 9, 1989 (R. at 
116-17). On May 2, 1989, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
case to this Court for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 21, 1988, Micki Horn and Julie Lund were 
working at the Payless Shoe Source (hereinafter "shoe store"), 
located at 3500 South 5710 West in Magna, Utah, when a black 
male, later identified as defendant, entered the store (R. 129 at 
52, 74). Defendant was wearing a mask consisting of beige and 
pink nylon stockings and carrying a sawed-off shotgun (R. 129 at 
52, 54, 74, 76, 87). 
Defendant first approached Micki Horn and, pointing the 
shotgun at her, walked her to the counter, telling her "just open 
the register and give me all the money" (R. 129 at 52). As Horn 
was opening the register, defendant said, "I swear if you set off 
the alarm I'm going to blow you in half" (R. 129 at 53). Horn 
testified that during this time she was able to closely observe 
defendant, "looking right at his face the whole time". This 
allowed her to positively identify him at trial (R. 129 at 55, 
57). Defendant was wearing baggy "khaki p^nts" and a long 
sleeved shirt (R. 129 at 63). Horn removed the money from the 
till and handed it to defendant (R. 129 at 54). 
A second employee, Julie Lund, had observed defendant 
enter the store and order Horn to remove the money (R. 129 at 
74). Defendant ordered Lund to get on the floor behind the 
register and open a safe (R. 129 at 53, 75). Lund complied and 
In court, Ms. Horn identified the defendant as follows: 
Well, when I walked in I sat down and he 
turned around and it hit me like h ton of 
bricks. I recognized him. And tnat was it. 
And everything about him—the features—I 
just . . . it was him. I just couldn't—I 
don't know. But I recognized him. The way 
he moved, the way his back was ovfer, the 
wrinkles on the forehead, his nose, 
everything. 
(R. 129 at 57-58). 
removed a Valley Bank deposit bag and loose cash (R. 129 at 53, 
75-76). Defendant placed the money bag and cash in an "acid wash 
jean bag" (R. 129 at 76). While Lund was on the floor, two 
customers entered the store (R. 129 at 55, 75, 77). Defendant 
told Horn to get rid of them (R. 129 at 55). As she was doing 
so, defendant retrieved the money and fled the store (R. 129 at 
58, 76). As defendant was leaving, Lund observed him remove the 
nylon stocking mask (R. 129 at 76). 
As defendant fled, he was observed by Nanci Condi who 
was in her car just outside the shoe store (R. 129 at 86). Condi 
testified that defendant was wearing something pink on his head, 
and "frantically" placing something in the "darker color[ed]" bag 
he was carrying (R. 129 at 87, 90). As defendant ran, he removed 
the pink and beige nylon mask and proceeded through a field 
between the shoe store and a nearby Albertsons. Then he jumped 
into a "little white stationwagon car" driven by a black woman 
(R. 129 at 87-89). 
Condi entered the shoe store and inquired whether there 
had been a robbery. She spoke on the phone with the police about 
what she had seen, giving a description of the car, the driver, 
and the direction that the vehicle was moving (R. 129 at 88-89). 
Condi also told police that the robber was a black male wearing 
"baggy khaki colored pants and a white sweatshirt" (R. 129 at 89-
90). 
Officer Kory Newbold of the West Valley Police 
Department was on his way to investigate the robbery when he saw 
a "smaller compact white stationwagon" with three occupants, whom 
he thought were Hispanic (R. 115, 117, 129). The dispatch report 
indicated that the store had been robbed by a male Hispanic (R. 
129 at 116). After observing the vehicle ahd its occupants, 
Officer Newbold turned on his "emergency overheads" (R. 129 at 
116). The driver of the white station wagon did not pull over 
but continued on, increasing in speed and temporarily eluding 
Officer Newbold (R. 129 at 116, 118). After a short time, 
Officer Newbold again spotted the white station wagon and 
subsequently stopped the car which then contained only two women 
(R. 129 at 117). He ordered the woman drivler to throw the keys 
out of the car window, and ordered the two women to place their 
hands on the ceiling of the car (R. 129 at 118). 
Officer Newbold explained to the driver that he was 
attempting to locate a suspect involved in an armed robbery. 
When he saw that the occupants of the car were black, he 
explained that he was looking for a Hispanic and apologized (R. 
129 at 119). Upon returning to his patrol car, Officer Newbold 
received updated information from the dispatcher, which indicated 
that the suspect was possibly a black male, and identified the 
vehicle as a white compact station wagon (R. 129 at 119). The 
dispatch also indicated that the robber had placed the money in a 
denim bag (R. 129 at 119). Officer Newbold had noticed an open 
blue denim bag in the back seat of the automobile so he stopped 
the vehicle again. He handcuffed the occupants of the car, 
Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus (R. at 120, 122). Shortly 
thereafter, Officer Newbold was approached by Scott Jones (R. 129 
at 120-121). 
Scott Jones told Officer Newbold that, as he was 
driving in the vicinity of the arrest, he saw a black male 
wearing pants and a sweatshirt jump out of the white compact 
station wagon just moments before it was stopped by the officer 
(R. 129 at 107, 120-121). Mr. Jones testified that he pursued the 
man for "a while", losing sight of him for about twenty minutes. 
When he again spotted the man, he had changed from "khaki" 
colored long pants and a long light colored shirt into shorts (R. 
129 at 107, 112-113). In October of 1988, Mr. Jones participated 
in a lineup during which he identified a male, other than 
defendant, as possibly the individual who had exited the white 
station wagon (R. 129 at 109). 
Nanci Condi and Julie Lund were driven by police 
officer Coy Acocks to the scene of the arrest in order to try to 
identify the automobile and, possibly, the suspects (R. 129 at 
92). Lund testified that she recognized "one girl [as] being in 
the store earlier" (R. 129 at 79). Condi identified the white 
station wagon as the one used in the robbery (R. 129 at 92, 94). 
As Officer Acocks was returning the witnesses, he recovered the 
shotgun and a bag of money from children who had found them in 
the area (R. 129 at 79, 99, 104, 137, 140, 143, 145). Lund 
identified the shotgun as the weapon used in the robbery (R. 129 
at 80-81). The money was contained within a "blue denim 
whitewash type bag" (R. 129 at 140). Two nylon stockings, one 
beige and one pink, were also recovered from the white station 
2 
During the lineup, Mr. Scott placed the lineup number on 
the back of the lineup card, which indicated he was not positive 
as to the identification (R. 129 at 56, 62, 109). 
wagon (R. 130 at 34, State's exhibit #4). 
Detective Ron Edwards of the West Valley Police 
Department was called to investigate the robbery (R. 129 at 148). 
During the investigation, he interviewed Rosemary Mar and Genora 
Marcellus separately (R. 129 at 148). Detective Edwards 
testified that, after he read Mar the Miranjda rights, she 
voluntarily agreed to speak with him but refused to allow the 
interview to be tape recorded (R. 129 at 1419). Mar indicated 
that she, Marcellus, and defendant were in the white station 
wagon together at approximately 3:00 p.m., when she and Marcellus 
exited the car and entered the shoe store (R. 129 at 151). 
Unable to find what they wanted, they returned to the car (R. 129 
at 151). She said that defendant then exited the car and entered 
the store, returning a few minutes later to inform them that he 
had robbed the store (R. 130 at 151). Mar indicated that when 
they were being pursued by police, she threw the money and 
shotgun out the window, and forced defendant from the car (R. 130 
at 152). 
Detective Edwards testified that he then interviewed 
Genora Marcellus, who also refused to allow the interview to be 
tape recorded (R. 130 at 153). Genora's version of the events 
was basically consistent with that of Mar, with the exception of 
where the car was parked prior to the robbery (R. 130 at 154). 
Detective Edwards testified that he interviewed 
defendant the day after the robbery, August 22, 1988 (R. 130 at 
157). Defendant also refused to allow the interview to be tape 
3 
recorded (R. 129 at 157). Officers Scott Carver and Richard 
Sullivan were present during the first part of the interview. 
Officer Edwards testified: 
As I entered the room Mr. Drawn and the two 
other officers were there. And Mr. Drawn 
stated his innocence at that time but that he 
didn't know what he was talking about. He 
stated that he had talked to Rosemary from 
the jail and that Rosemary told him that some 
black guy was running by the Payless Shoes, 
waved 'em down and asked to jump—to get in 
the car, to drive them away, that some white 
boys were chasing him. At which time I 
explained to Mr. Drawn I didn't believe his 
story and at which time I asked if he had 
already had his rights per Miranda given to 
him at which time he asked if he could speak 
to me alone and have the two other officers 
leave the room. 
(R. 129 at 158-599). Carver was defendant's parole officer and 
defendant feared that anything he said might affect his parole 
(R. 131 at 25). Detective Edwards testified that after Sullivan 
and Carver left the room, the following transpired: 
After the two other officers left the room I 
asked him point blank, did you do the 
robbery? He said, what's in it for me? I 
said, I can't give you any promises. 
Everything's going to have to go through the 
county attorney's office. He stated, I don't 
want Rosemary charged. I says, I still 
cannot give you a guarantee. I said, that's 
up to the county attorney's office about 
that. He stated, yes, I did it. I said, 
will you explain to me how you did it. He 
says that they were at his sister's place, 
Audrey's on Sunday afternoon. They left the 
house in her car. They were going west. 
That Rosemary wanted him to do the robbery. 
It was his girlfriend. That they went out to 
the Payless Shoe on 5600 West and 3500 South* 
Detective Edwards testified that during his 14 years as a 
police officer "less than 10 percent of the defendants would, or 
suspects would, ever want their conversation taped" (R. 130 at 
11). 
He had the two girls go in to lodk at the 
building, the Payless Shoes, how many girls 
were there, where the safe was and the 
diagram of the place, more or less, at which 
time they came out, then he went in and 
robbed them. 
He stated he had a shotgun, that he put 
the mask over his head. He went in there 
with the shotgun. He stated at t^ hat time it 
wasn't loaded, that he didn't warit to hurt 
anybody. He said he went in there, had 
forced one woman down, he took the other 
woman back to the safe and to the till, put 
the money in a denim bag and ran out. 
He said he got in the car; they took 
off. As he went down one of the streets they 
said a West Valley officer turned around on 
'em; they tried to evade him. He jumped out 
at that time. 
He says that Rosemary threw the gun and 
the money out of the car. He werit into the 
bushes in a field, did a semi circle and 
watched the officers there from across the 
street in the weeds. 
After the vehicle was impounded and 
everybody left he then started to hitchhike. 
A gentleman in an older pickup picked him up, 
he was home — well, he was with his sister, 
Audrey, at the time when I called Audrey 
about 8:00 o'clock on the night before, that 
he was at his sister's residence. 
(R. 129 at 159-160). 
Officer Scott Carver testified that he was present when 
the interrogation of defendant began, and stated that following 
the interview with Detective Edwards, he had a short conversation 
with defendant, who told him, "I told 'em 1 did it so they would 
let Rosemary go" (R. 130 at 43). 
Audrey Robinson, defendant's sister, testified that her 
brother was at her home on August 21, 1988, and stayed there 
while Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus took the car to drive 
Genora home (R. 130 at 48-50). On rebuttal, Detective Edwards 
testified that he telephoned Ms. Robinson on the evening of the 
robbery and she said that she had not seen defendant all day (R. 
130 at 70). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court need not address the issues raised by 
defendant regarding the in-court identification and the 
admissibility of out-of-court statements because they are merely 
cumulative to his confession. Defendant has not challenged the 
admission of his confession on appeal, stating only that he 
testified that the confession never happened. The issues raised 
by defendant were harmless error, if they were error at all, 
because the contested evidence was cumulative to defendant's 
confession. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
admitting the evidence of the in-court identification of 
defendant by a witness. The comparison of that in-court 
identification with results from a previous lineup and a lineup 
photograph at trial applies to the weight the jury was to give to 
the identification, rather than to its admissibility. An 
extensive eyewitness identification instruction was given which 
helped the jury in determiningwhat weight to give the in-court 
identification. 
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion when 
it allowed the out-of-court statements of witnesses who had been 
present when defendant committed the robbery but who did not 
appear for trial. The witnesses were friends of defendant, one 
of whom had moved and was living under an assumed name. The 
other lived with her mother whom the detective contacted. The 
mother told the detective that the witness had received her 
subpoena and would be at trial. The State had demonstrated the 
unavailability of the witnesses after diligent effort to secure 
their attendance. 
The State also established the reliability of the 
statements by showing that they were made against interest. They 
were also consistent with the defendant's confession, with each 
other, and with the observation of other witnesses. 
Finally, defendant's claim that the imposition of an 
enhanced sentence for use of a firearm in the commission of an 
aggravated robbery violated statutory construction and the Double 
Jeopardy Clause must fail. The firearm enhancement statute was 
enacted after the aggravated robbery statutte and does not 
expressly exclude aggravated robbery from its ambit. Since the 
enhancement statute is not ambiguous and includes aggravated 
robbery on its face, this Court must presume that the legislature 
intended to include aggravated robbery in the firearm enhancement 
provision. 
Neither does this use of the firearm enhancement 
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The United States Supreme 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court have determined that the 
imposition of cumulative punishments is a legislative matter. 
If, as here, the legislature has established further enhancement 
for the use of a firearm, and has declared when it may be 
imposed, there is no double jeopardy problem. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY CONFESSION TO OFFICER 
EDWARDS, AFTER BEING ADVISED UNDER MIRANDA, 
RENDERS THE ALLEGED ERRORS RAISED IN POINTS I 
AND II OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF HARMLESS. 
The first two issues raised by defendant on appeal are 
that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting the 
in-court identification by Micki Horn, and in admitting the out-
of-court statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus. The 
merits of these claims will be addressed hereafter, but the 
issues can be resolved without reaching the merits. Detective 
Edwards testified that defendant confessed to him that defendant 
did commit the robbery. Shortly before trial, defendant filed a 
motion to suppress the statement taken by Detective Edwards (R. 
at 23). No memorandum in support of that motion was filed, but 
defendant stated his position on the motion at a hearing which 
was held an hour before trial (R. 131). 
At that hearing, defendant admitted that he was aware 
that the prosecution intended to use his admissions but 
complained that he had not received a copy of the officer's 
report containing the statement (R. 131 at 4). He did not claim 
a discovery violation. Neither did he claim that he was not 
properly advised of his right to counsel under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); in fact, he testified that he had 
been so advised (R. 131 at 19). Also at that hearing, defendant 
testified that he had never made the admission to Detective 
Edwards (R. 131 at 21). The trial court obviously found the 
detective's testimony more credible and ruled that the confession 
was admissible (R. 131 at 28). 
On appeal, defendant does not challenge this ruling. 
The only briefly mentions his confession in his brief at pages 
15, 27 and 32. At page 15, defendant says that "[t]he only other 
evidence tying Appellant to the crime was his confession, which 
the jurors might have discounted as his effort to protect his 
girlfriend, or as never having been made, and the unreliable 
confessions of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus, . . . " At page 
27 defendant says, ••[a]ppellant testified at the suppression 
hearing that his confession never occurred". Finally, at page 
32, defendant maintains: 
In this case, the confessions of Ms. Mar, 
Ms. Marcellus, and Appellant were the only 
evidence of Appellant's participation in the 
robbery (aside from the in court 
identification by the victim, Micki Horn, 
which should have been suppressed!). The 
confessions in this case interlocked to a 
great degree, and must have added credence to 
the confession that Officer Edwards testified 
Appellant made to him. In the absence of the 
admission of the statements Ms. Mar and Ms. 
Marcellus allegedly made to Officer Edwards, 
the jurors might have discounted Appellant's 
alleged confession as fiction authored by 
Officer Edwards, or as Appellant's effort to 
protect his girlfriend, Rosemary Mar. 
It is clear that defendant wanted the jury to believe that he 
never confessed to Detective Edwards so the other women also may 
not have made the statements Detective Edwards contributes to 
them. It is also clear that the trial court did not accept that 
theory because it allowed into evidence defendant's confession, 
as well as the statements of the two women involved. Finally, it 
is clear that the jury also did not believe that Detective 
Edwards was lying about the confession and statements which he 
took from the participants of the robbery. Defendant has not 
presented a legal challenge to the admission of his confession. 
Since defendant has not done so and since the confession was 
corroborated by the eyewitness evidence, any alleged error in 
admitting the in-court identification of Ms. Horn and the out-of-
court statements of Mar and Marcellus was harmless at most. 
Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that "any error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30 (1982). The Utah 
Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 
1989), referred to harmless error as error "sufficiently 
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceeding." Ld. at 120; see also State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 
919 (Utah 1987) and State v. Dibello, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 
(1989) (videotape complained of was no more gruesome than 
cumulative photographs, the admission of which defendant did not 
appeal). 
Officer Ron Edwards of the West Valley Police 
Department testified that during an interview conducted the day 
following the robbery, defendant made a voluntary confession: 
After the two other officers left the room I 
asked him point blank, did you do the 
robbery? He said, what's in it for me? I 
said, I can't give you any promises. 
Everything's going to have to go through the 
county attorney's office. He stated, I don't 
want Rosemary charged. I says, I still 
cannot give you a guarantee. I said, that's 
up to the county attorney's office about 
that. He stated, yes, I did it. I said, 
will you explain it to me how you did it. He 
says that they were at his sister's place, 
Audrey's on Sunday afternoon, Thtey left the 
house in her car. They were goinb west. 
That Rosemary wanted him to do the robbery. 
It was his girlfriend. That they went out to 
the Payless Shoe on 5600 West and 3500 South. 
He had the two girls go in to look at the 
building, the Payless Shoes, how many girls 
were there, where the safe was and the 
diagram of the place, more or less, at which 
time they came out, then he went in and 
robbed them. 
He stated he had a shotgun, that he put 
the mask over his head. He went in there 
with the shotgun. He stated at that time it 
wasn't loaded, that he didn't want to hurt 
anybody. He said he went in there, had 
forced one woman down, he took the other 
woman back to the safe and to the 
the money in a denim bag and ran 
He said he got in the car; the\y took off. 
As he went down one of the streets they said 
a West Valley officer turned around on 'em; 
they tried to evade him. He jumped out at 
that time. 
He says that Rosemary threw tne gun and 
the money out of the car. He went into the 
bushes in a field, did a semi circle and 
watched the officers there from across the 
street in the weeds. 
After the vehicle was impounded and 
everybody left he then started to hitchhike, 
till, put 
but. 
A gentleman in an older pickup pi eked him up, 
he was home — well, he was with his sister, 
Audrey, at the time when I called Audrey 
about 8:00 o'clock on the night before, that 
he was at his sister's residence. 
(R. 129 at 159-160). In addition, Scott Carver, defendant's 
parole officer, testified that, following the interview with 
Detective Edwards, he had a short conversation with defendant, 
who told him, "I told 'em I did it so they Would let Rosemary go" 
(R. 130 at 43). 
The confession by the defendant, taken by Detective 
Edwards and confirmed by Officer Carver, along with substantial 
consistent circumstantial evidence presented at trial, was 
sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery. The 
identification testimony by Micki Horn challenged in Point I and 
the statements by the codefendants challenged in Point II were 
merely surplus evidence unnecessary for conviction. Therefore, 
even if one assumed that the trial court erred on either of the 
grounds raised in Points I and II, the likelihood of a different 
outcome was not "sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the 
verdict," and any error would be harmless. State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) . 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE IN-COURT 
IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT BY MICKI HORN. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by allowing 
the in-court identification of defendant by eyewitness, Micki 
Horn. While any error on this point would be harmless (see Point 
I), it is also clear that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by allowing the identification testimony. 
Ms. Horn testified that during the robbery, as she was 
removing the money from the register, she was able to closely 
observe defendant "looking right at his face the whole time." (R. 
129 at 55, 57). Following the robbery, Horn gave police a 
description of defendant's clothing which was consistent with the 
testimony of other witnesses, and a description of defendant 
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which was very similar to his general appearance. 
As part of her description, Ms. Horn told police she 
believed defendant was possibly a male Hispanic. While the State 
acknowledges defendant is black, his light skin color is 
consistent with the Hispanic race (See Def. Exh. #2). 
_i c_ 
At trial, over the objection of defense counsel, the 
court allowed Horn to make an in-court identification from her 
independent recollection. Horn testified: 
Well, when I walked in I sat down and he 
turned around and it hit me like a ton of 
bricks. I recognized him. And that was it. 
And everything about him — the features — I 
just . . . it was him. I just couldn't—I 
don't know. But I recognized himL The way 
he moved, the way his back was overf the 
wrinkles on the forehead, his nos©f 
everything. 
(R. 129 at 57-58). 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the 
Court "will not interfere with the trial court's ruling on 
evidentiary matters unless it clearly appeals that the court so 
abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice 
resulted." State v. McClain/ 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985); see also 
State v. Gentry/ 7.47 P.2d 1032/ 1035 (Utah X987); State v. 
McCardell/ 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). 
Defendant argues on appeal that Htirn's identification 
"was the product of the fact that defendant was the person 
sitting in the defendant's chair at trial"/ and in support 
thereof/ points to two previous misidentif ictations by Horn; the 
first/ during a lineup conducted September 29/ 1988/ and the 
second/ during trial from a photo of the September 29th lineup. 
While the misidentifications may have affected the 
weight given Horn's testimony/ the trial court properly 
determined that they did not preclude her from making a 
subsequent in-court identification/ especially under the 
circumstances that the misidentifications w0re made. 
Horn testified that during the September 29th lineup 
she was not wearing her glasses, and made the identification from 
the back row of the observation room. In addition, Horn 
testified she was distracted: 
I had a 12-month old baby with me in a 
stroller and she was off to the side of me 
and as soon as we walked in she was getting 
real ansy [sic]. She picked up her bottle 
and threw it down and I was trying to keep 
her quiet while I was trying to watch the 
lineup. 
(R. 129 at 56). Finally, Horn placed the lineup identification 
number on the reverse side of the identification card which she 
was told to do if she was not positive of the identification (R. 
129 at 56). 
The second misidentification, which occurred during 
trial, is equally explainable. On cross-examination, defense 
counsel asked Horn if she could identify defendant from a photo 
of the September 29th lineup. Ms. Horn indicated that she 
believed defendant was in the number two position (R. 129 at 66). 
The State stipulated that defendant was actually in the number 
three position. This mistake seemed to be unexplainable until 
later when evidence showed that the individual in position number 
two was actually defendant's cousin who was similar in appearance 
(R. 130 at 60-61). In addition, Ms. Horn testified that when she 
initially observed the photo she believed defendant to be either 
in position number two or three, but only chose number two 
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because he appeared to be shorter (R. 129 at 71). 
In the lineup photo the individual in position number 2 has 
his head tilted down. 
Considering the circumstances, allowing the evidence 
was not a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
court. Horn gave reasonable explanations for the 
misidentifications; she had ample opportunity to observe 
defendant at the time of the robbery "looking right at his face 
the whole time", sufficient to make an accurate identification of 
defendant at trial; and the jury was properly guided by the use 
of a lengthy cautionary instruction concerning eyewitness 
testimony (R. at 97-100) as required by Sta^e v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1986). All of this supported the admission of the 
identification testimony. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS OF ROSEMARY MAR AND GENORA MARCELLUS 
PURSUANT TO RULE 802 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE. 
Defendant next argues that he was denied his "rights to 
confrontation under the Utah and federal constitutions" when the 
trial court allowed the statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora 
Marcellus to be admitted upon a finding that the witnesses were 
unavailable pursuant to Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Again, any error on this point would be harmless (see Point I), 
thus it was not a clear abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to allow the testimony. 
The United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56 (1980) stated: 
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not 
present for cross-examination at trial the 
Confrontation Clause normally requires a 
showing that he is unavailable. Even then, 
his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate 'indicia of reliability.' 
Reliability can be inferred without more in a 
case where the evidence falls within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, 
the evidence must be excluded, at least 
absent a showing of particularized guarantees 
of trustworthiness. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (footnote omitted). Sufficient evidence 
was presented at trial to establish witness unavailability and 
the reliability of the statements. 
A. Unavailability 
Prior to trial, the court received testimony regarding 
the prosecution's efforts to assure the attendance of witnesses 
Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar at trial. Subpoenas were sent 
to both witnesses, twice to Rosemary Mar. 
Detective Edwards testified that only a few days prior 
to trial, he made the following attempts to assure the witnesses 
presence at trial. Edwards phoned the home of Ms. Marcellus's 
mother, Haydie Grand, where Marcellus was then residing. Grand 
answered the phone, and, after indicating that Ms. Marcellus was 
not at home, assured Edwards that Marcellus "had received the 
subpoena [and] that she was going to be there." (R. 131 at 39-
40). 
Edwards was unable to locate Ms. Mar at her home 
address (its location was found through use of department 
informants), and had discovered just the day before trial that 
she had been going by an assumed name. Edwards also received 
information of another possible address from Salt Lake County 
Investigator Steve Bartlett, which also came up negative when he 
tried to find Mar (R. 131 at 40). Testimony at trial showed that 
Mar was possibly living in Indiana, but the address was unknown 
(R. 130 at 51). 
The trial court determined that the State had made a 
sufficient showing of unavailability. As n0ted in Point II, the 
Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the Court "will 
not interfere with the trial court's ruling on evidentiary 
matters unless it clearly appears that the court so abused its 
discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted." 
State v. McClainf 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985); see also State v. 
Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1987); Stftte v. McCardell, 652 
P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). This standard of review includes a trial 
court's determination of whether "prosecutorial authorities have 
made a good faith effort to obtain . . . [the presence of a 
witness] at trial." State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981). 
In Brooks, the Utah Supreme Court stated "we will not reverse the 
ruling of the trial judge that the efforts were made in good 
faith in the absence of a showing of clear abuse of discretion." 
Id. at 539.; see also State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 
1982); Gallegos v. Turner, 526 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1974). 
The effort to compel the attendance of Genora Marcellus 
was clearly sufficient due to the reasonable reliance by the 
State that the witness would voluntarily comply with the 
subpoena. In State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982), the 
Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial court finding that a witness 
was "unavailable" when a witness failed to comply with a subpoena 
after he had assured the county attorney of his intention to 
comply. The Court explained: 
When Scoville first contacted the county 
attorney on February 26, he said he would 
attend the trial. Because of these 
responses, the State had no reason to 
question Scovillefs availability prior to 
seven days before trial. After learning late 
on February 26 that Scoville would not attend 
and failing in their attempts to contact 
Scoville's employer on February 27, the State 
had only five days to implement the Uniform 
Act. While it is possible to imagine more 
concerted efforts by the State to secure 
voluntary compliance, we hold on these facts 
that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that the State 
acted in good faith in attempting to secure 
Scoville's attendance at trial. 
Id. at 1123-24. In the present case, the prosecution had 
received no direct information which would cause it to question 
the assurances given by Genora Marcellus' mother that her 
daughter would comply with the subpoena. While the prosecution 
could have used other methods to ensure compliance, such was 
unnecessary when there was reason to believe the witness would do 
so voluntarily. 
The effort to compel the attendance of Rosemary Mar was 
similarly sufficient due to inability of the prosecution to 
locate the witness. Unlike those cases where a prosecutor had 
specific knowledge of the whereabouts of a witness and thereafter 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Case, 752 P.2d 356 
(Utah App. 1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1277 (1987), determined 
that even with assurances by a witness of an intent to comply 
with a subpoena, a trial court erred by finding a witness 
unavailable after noncompliance with the subpoena. Yet, this 
case is fact sensitive and distinguishable from the case at bar. 
In Case, the witness was critical, constantly moved ("nomadic 
habits"), was located outside the State, and was unstable 
financially. Under these facts the Court indicated that the 
prosecutor should have secured attendance by using Uniform Act to 
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in 
Criminal Proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-21-1 et 
seq. (1982). 
failed to compel attendance, in the present case, tne 
prosecution, after a good-faith effort, was not able to locate 
the witness. As testified by Detective Edwards, the witness 
could not be located at her home address or at even a second 
possible address, and was going under an assumed name. In 
addition, there was evidence that one of the witnesses may have 
been residing in Indiana, but the exact location was unknown. 
In State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld a trial court's determination that witnesses 
(victims) were "unavailable" after an officer testified that 
M[h]e had contacted all known relatives, likely hangouts, the 
local bus terminals and out of state police." ^ d. at 540. In 
upholding the determination, the Court stated, "[a]lthough in 
retrospect other efforts might have been madfe [to locate the 
witnesses], the determination does not appear to us to be an 
abuse of discretion." ]^d. at 540. In Ohio y. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56, 75 (1980), the United States Supreme Court found a good-faith 
effort to ensure a witness' presence where the prosecution had 
subpoenaed the witness five times, and the witness' family had 
not been able to locate her for a year. It does not appear that 
the efforts made in those cases were any greater than in the case 
at bar. And it appears that the courts in other states have 
upheld less good-faith efforts as sufficient. See e.g. State v. 
Grier, 331 S.E.2d 669 (N.C. 1985) (effort consisted of repeated 
attempts to locate witness at various addresses by phone and 
person); State v. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d 773 (Mo. App. 1980) 
(sheriff unsuccessfully attempted to serve subpoena on witness 
and made inquiries in the general area of his usual place of 
residence). 
While it is conceivable that other methods possibly 
could have been used to locate the witness, the prosecution was 
not required to exhaust all possible alternatives in order to 
show unavailability, and, under the circumstances, it is very 
questionable whether any other methods would have located the 
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witness. It was clearly not an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to determine that the witnesses were unavailable. 
B. Reliability of the Statements. 
As required by Roberts, the out-of-court statements 
must also bear adequate "indicia of reliability" in order to be 
admissible. The statements of Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar 
were sufficiently reliable for at least two reasons. First, as 
determined by the trial court, the statements made by the 
witnesses were "statements against interest" as defined by Utah 
Rules of Evidence 804. Second, the independent statements given 
by the witnesses, and the defendant, were consistent in all 
material respects. 
As indicated above, the United States Supreme Court in 
Roberts stated, " [reliability can be inferred without more in a 
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. At the pretrial hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court determined that 
7 
Taking into consideration that the witness could not be 
located at her home address, nor at a second address, and was 
going under an assumed name, and was facing possible criminal 
charges, it would be reasonable to assume the witness was 
intentionally evading the law. 
the statements of Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar were within 
the "firmly rooted hearsay exception" of statements against 
interest under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 804(b)(3) provides in pertinent part: 
A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest 
tended to subject him to civil or| 
liability, or to render invalid a 
him against another, that a reasonable man in 
his position would not have made 
, or so far 
criminal 
claim by 
the 
Statement unless he believed it to be true. 
Rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence (emphasis added). While the 
witnesses may have denied responsibility for the robbery, or even 
knowledge of the robbery until after it was committed, their 
statements concerning their participation clearly exposed them to 
a possibility of criminal prosecution, at least for assisting in 
o 
the commission of a crime. 
The testimony of the witnesses wa$ also reliable due to 
the consistency of the statements. While the evidence shows that 
the witnesses were interviewed separately, each of the statements 
was entirely consistent with the others in all material 
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respects. The United States Supreme Court in Lee v. Illinois, 
476 U.S. 530 (1986) stated "when codefendants' confessions are 
identical in all material respects, the likelihood that they are 
o 
While neither witness has been convicted for participating 
in the robbery, such is not required by Rule 804 in order to be a 
statement against interest. 
Q 
The only differences in the statements were insignificant, 
and concerned, as defendant concedes, only three limited areas: 
(1) witness foreknowledge of the robbery; (2) participation in 
"casing" the store; and (3) which participant wanted the robbery 
committed. A fourth possible area, also insignificant, is where 
the car was parked prior to the robbery. 
accurate is significantly increased." Lee, 476 U.S. at 545. The 
comment by the Court is basic common sense. Where three 
consistent statements are taken from three different individuals, 
not in the presence of each other, and without knowledge of what 
the other may have stated, the probability that the statements 
are true is very high. Because the statements were consistent 
and were against the witnesses' penal interest, there is little 
doubt that the statements were reliable. Having established the 
unavailability of the witnesses and the reliability of their 
statements, the prosecution did not abridge the defendant's right 
to confrontation, and the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by allowing the testimony. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO 
AN ADDITIONAL TERM OF FIVE YEARS FOR USE OF A 
FIREARM.. 
In his final argument, defendant contends that the 
trial court erred by sentencing him to a term of five years to 
life upon his conviction of aggravated robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (Supp. 1989), along with an additional five year 
enhancement for use of a firearm during the commission of a 
felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1989). 
Defendant claims, "[t]his double enhancement of Defendant's 
sentence is not supported by the applicable statutes, and 
Defendant attempts to attack this consistency on the 
grounds that it was a single officer who took the testimony and 
without the use of a tape recorder. Yet, it was defendant who 
asked that their statements not be recorded and that the other 
officers leave the room (R. 131 at 12-13 and 25). Defendant's 
attack on the officer's credibility is without merit. 
violated Defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of 
the Utah and United States Constitutions" (Brief of Appellant at 
35). To determine whether the enhancemerit of defendant's 
sentence was proper, it is necessary to determine the legislative 
intent § 76-3-203. 
A. Firearm Enhancement 
When construing a statute, the CoMrt must be controlled 
by the evident purpose of the legislature tb attain a certain 
end; a statute should not be applied or construed so as to 
produce incongruous results that were never intended. See State 
v. Navaro, 8 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955, 959 (1933). A "'statute should 
be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose 
which was sought to be accomplished.'" State v. Davis, 769 P.2d 
840 (Utah App. 1989), citing Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 
568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977); see also State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 
794 (Utah 1977); State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 571 
(1965). The best evidence of the true intejit and purpose of the 
legislature in enacting a statute is the pldin language of the 
statute. See Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 
903, 906 (Utah 1984); State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Utah 
1984). Finally, "it is the policy of the Court to construe 
statutes when possible to effectuate the legislative intent and 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that "as a 
general rule, we will not engage in state constitutional analysis 
unless an argument for different analyses under the State and 
federal constitutions is briefed." State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 
(Utah 1987); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-273 (Utah 1985). 
Since defendant has not argued a different analysis for the State 
and federal constitutions, this Court should! address this issue 
on federal constitutional grounds only. 
to avoid potential constitutional conflicts." State v. Casarez, 
656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently recognized the 
principle that its primary responsibility in construing 
legislation is to determine and give effect to the legislative 
intent. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317; Bd. of Educ. 
of Granite Sch. v. Salt Lake Cityf 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 
1983); Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755, 756 
(Utah 1982). As stated in Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. v. Salt 
Lake City; 
the fundamental consideration in interpreting 
statutes is legislative intent; and that is 
determined in light of the purpose the 
statute was designed to achieve. Intent is 
applied to carry out the purpose if it can be 
done in a manner which is consistent with the 
language of the statue. . . . "The intention 
of the legislature, however, should be 
controlling and no formalistic rule of 
grammar of word form should stand in the way 
of carrying out legislative intent." 
659 P.2d at 1033 (citations omitted) (emphasis deleted) (quoting 
1A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed.) § 25.03. Reason 
and intention must prevail over "technically applied 
literalness", Andrus v. Allredy 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 
972, 974 (1965). 
Turning to the statutes in question, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1978) reads in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife 
or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon. * 
Defendant argues that since the aggravated robbery statute 
specifically refers to "firearm", whereas other Utah aggravated 
*%o 
statutes use the more generic term "deadly weapon", the Utah 
legislature intended any firearm enhancement for robbery to be 
included solely in the substantive statute and excluded from 
inclusion in the enhancement statute. 
To properly answer defendant's argument, the 
legislative history and statutory language of both statutes must 
be reviewed with a view to harmonizing their intended purposes. 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318; Utah County v. Orem 
City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985). 
The legislative record does not reveal why the 
aggravated robbery statute was amended in 1975 to include the 
firearm and facsimile language. However, the legislative history 
does establish that two years later, in 1977, growing public 
concern over the increased use of firearms in the commission of 
crimes in Utah prompted the Utah legislature to enact the 
enhancement statute increasing the penalty for any felony 
committed by use of a firearm. See House debate on Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302, aggravated robbery statute, originally S.B. 159, 
passed by House of Representatives March 13, 1975, disc. #405; 
and House debate on Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203, enhanced penalty 
statute, originally H.B. 323, passed by House of Representatives 
February 28, 1977, disc. #181-82. No legislative record could be 
found of Senate debate on either bill. 
The language of the enhancement statute is clear and 
unambiguous in its scope. It mandates the imposition of an 
increased term of one to five years "if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was 
used in the commission of the furtherance of a felony". Utah 
Code Ann. 76-3-203 (1). State v. Willettf 694 P.2d 601, 603 
(Utah 1984). Unlike other sentencing statutes, the enhancement 
statue contains no exclusionary language. See for comparison, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-406(1) (Supp. 1989) (probation, suspension, 
and lower category of offense shall not be granted for certain 
listed attempt crimes); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (Supp. 1989) 
(classification of criminal attempt); and, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
1001 (1978) (habitual criminal statute not applicable to murder 
in first or second degree). Without any clear exclusions, the 
enhancement provision, on its face, applies to all felonies. 
Such an interpretation is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's rule that: 
Statutes are considered to be in pari 
materia and thus must be construed together 
when they relate to the same person or thing, 
to the same class of persons or things, or 
have the same purpose or object. If it is 
natural or reasonable to think that the 
understanding of the legislature or of 
persons affected by the statute would be 
influenced by another statute, then those 
statutes should be construed to be in pari 
materia, construed with reference to one 
another and harmonized if possible. 
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (footnotes omitted). 
Accord, Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318; State v. 
Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986). Thus, in the absence of any 
express repealing language or amendment, a new statutory 
provision is presumed to be in accord with the legislative policy 
embodied in prior statutes covering the same subject matter. 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314. 1318, citing 2A C. Sands, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 290 (4th ed. 1973). 
Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are compared 
with the new provision. If possible by reasonable construction, 
both statutes should be construed such that effect is given to 
every provision in both of them. Id* a t 13DL8. Accord, Ellis v. 
Utah State Retirement Bd., 757 P.2d 882f 884-85 (Utah App. 1988). 
But, if an irreconcilable conflict still exists between the old 
and new statutory language, the new statutory provision will 
control as the latest expression of legislative intent. Murray 
City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318. 
This Court must accord a statute every presumption of 
validity. Timpanogos Planning v. Central Ut|ah Water, 690 P.2d 
562, 564 (Utah 1984), citing Murray City v. Hall. Further, a 
statute must be interpreted and applied in light of its purpose. 
State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 1977). Here, based on the 
legislative history and statutory language, ithere can be no 
serious dispute that the Utah legislature intended to penalize 
more severely substantive felony crimes if committed by use of a 
firearm than if not. State v. Willett, 694 p.2d 601, 603. Nor, 
can there be any reasonable dispute that the Utah legislature 
views aggravated robbery as seriously as othfer aggravated crimes 
12 13 
such as aggravated kidnapping , aggravated $exual assault and 
14 
aggravated burglary. Yet, in each of the latter cases, the 
penalty for the substantive nonaggravated offense may first be 
increased to an aggravated offense by the use of a firearm; and, 
1 2
 Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-302 (Supp. 1989). 
1 3
 Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-405 (Supp. 1989). 
1 4
 Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-203 (Supp. 1989). 
still have imposed an enhancement to the aggravated crime based 
solely on the use of the firearm. Why, then, would the Utah 
legislature have not intended for a similarly severe punishment 
in the case of an aggravated robbery committed by use of a 
firearm? The answer is that they did provide for a similar 
penalty* The very absence of any exclusionary language in the 
subsequently enacted enhancement provision stands as a silent 
pronouncement of the legislative intent to include all felonies 
within its scope, even when the substantive offense is defined as 
aggravated due to the use of a firearm. 
Defendant contends that such legislative action is 
prohibited by Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978). 
However, the type of statutory construction argument utilized in 
Simpson has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978), and has been substantially 
modified by subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions. 
Simpson involved the federal court's interpretation of 
overlapping federal statutes. The issue was whether the federal 
firearm enhancement provision should be applicable to the federal 
armed bank robbery statute. Rather than approaching the statutes 
from their plain meaning, the Court looked first to the 
enhancement provision's very specific legislative history. Based 
on the recorded statements of the sponsor of the enhancement 
provision that the federal armed robbery statute was exempted 
from inclusion, as well as the congressional record, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the federal armed robbery statute 
was legislatively intended to be exempted from the federal 
firearm enhancement provision. 435 U.S. at 13. Because of this 
express legislative intent, the Court concluded that the armed 
robbery and enhancement statutes created two separate and 
distinct offenses. As such, under federal strict construction 
principles, any conflict between the statutes has to be resolved 
in favor of lenity. Iji- at 14-15. 
Six months after the Simpson decision, the Utah Supreme 
Court took the opposite point of departure. In State v. Angus, 
581 P.2d 992 (1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that the Utah 
enhancement provisions and other substantive Utah felonies were 
not distinct crimes. Rather, the enhancement provision was 
merely a sentencing statute designed to incnease penalties under 
specified conditions. As noted, any argument that Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-3-203, the enhancement statute, creates a separate offense, 
imposing multiple sentences for the same criminal act is: 
a distortion of its language. When the 
matter is looked at correctly and 
realistically, it is seen that there is but 
one criminal act charged. . . . 
Id. at 994. Accord, State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 273 (Utah 
1985) (enhancement provision is not an element of the crime, but 
only an aspect of punishment). 
When viewed as a penalty provision and not a 
substantive offense, the Utah enhancement provision can be read 
harmoniously with the Utah aggravated robbery statute. Under 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302, aggravated robbery may be committed in 
an number of ways; but, if one of those methods is by use of a 
firearm, the defendant's sentence is subject to enhancement. No 
ambiguities exist to reconcile. At best, the aggravated robbery 
language, "uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a 
facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon" merely parallels the 
type of facsimile language used in the enhancement provision. 
But the plain meaning of both statutes is that while an armed 
robbery may be committed by the use of any deadly weapon, when 
that weapon is a firearm or facsimile of an firearm, the penalty 
15 
will be enhanced. Where there exists clear legislative intent 
to provide for an increased punishment, this Court should not 
infer a contrary intent simply because the statutory language may 
be unartful or piecemealed. State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601, 603. 
But, even if this court were to espouse Simpson v. 
United States as applicable to this case, the United States 
Supreme Court has substantially clarified its original holding. 
In Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), the United 
Utah's aggravated robbery statute was amended again in 1989 
to read: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; . • . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Supp. 1989). 
Section 76-1-601 defines dangerous weapon as follows: 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury, or a facsimile or representation of 
the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended 
use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he is in 
control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-601 (Supp. 1989). 
-.^4-
States Supreme Court concluded that: 
the "touchstone" of the rule of lenity 
[utilized in Simpson] "is statutory 
ambiguity.". . . "Where Congress has 
manifested its intention, we may not 
manufacture ambiguity in order to defeat the 
intent.". . . Lenity thus serves only as an 
aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to 
be used to beget one. 
450 U.S. at 342 (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 
387 (1980)). 
Even more expressly, the United States Supreme Court 
held that, under state law, a defendant could be convicted and 
punished for armed robbery, assault with malice and armed 
criminal action all as a result of the same criminal actions. 
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). Rejecting the state 
supreme court's holding of a double jeopardy violation, the 
federal supreme court concluded that the doiible jeopardy clause 
"does no more that prevent the sentencing court from prescribing 
greater punishment that the legislature intended." JW. at 366. 
As such, even cumulative punishments are not constitutionally 
prohibited where there is clear legislative intent in support. 
Citing Albernaz, the Court stated that the ihquiry for purposes 
of statutory construction or double jeopardy claims is merely to 
discern what the legislative intent was in enacting the two 
provisions. If the sentencing scheme is consistent with that 
purpose and not otherwise arbitrary, the statutory provisions 
must be given effect. Id. at 368-69. 
Here, the Utah legislature enacted a penalty for 
aggravated robbery, defined in part as robbery committed by use 
of a firearm. Some two years later, without express exemption, 
repeal or amendment, the Utah legislature enacted an equally 
clear statute mandating the imposition of an enhanced penalty for 
any felony where a firearm is used. Read together and with the 
purposes and intent of the criminal code, it is clear that no 
ambiguity exists as to the meaning or scope of either statute* 
The plain meaning of the statutes being apparent and no 
legislative history existing to show a contrary intent, this 
Court must implement the statutory penalties intended by law. 
B. The Double Jeopardy Clause 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States 
Constitution simply provides that no person shall "be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 
United States Constitution, Amendment V. While the language of 
the Clause appears quite simple, it has fostered considerable 
confusion and controversy in the past, prompting Chief Justice 
Renquist to once comment, "the decisional law in the area is a 
veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most 
intrepid judicial navigator." Albernaz v. United States, 450 
U.S. 333, 343 (1981). Albernaz, and subsequent opinions of the 
Court, have significantly clarified the proper role of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. While there remains some controversy to its 
specific application in certain contexts, the specific issue 
raised by defendant in this case has been unequivocally resolved. 
The present issue, whether the Double Jeopardy Clause 
may prevent an enhanced sentence for use of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1989), 
when the underlying substantive felony is aggravated robbery, 
Utah Code Anr -6-302 (Supp. 1989) , and aggravating 
elemer is us 
and retrospect, unw.;-;- ,;*•; tiv: tne Supreme 
decision in Simpson v. United States •?'• ^ 
S i m i ^ :\ * • • •=> 
following comment: 
Cases in which the Government is able to 
prove violations of two separate criminal 
statutes with precisely the same factual 
showing, as here, raise the prospect of 
double jeopardy arid the possible need, to 
evaluate the statutes i n ] I ght of the 
Blockburger test. 
I d ' i ^ 
Following Simpson, t^i Court managed 
addressing 4 question ui 
i , jntext, even t:*. ..... .:ic,» *o ; . onfusion 
1
 ^ tatf courts, and despite the desire of F P ^ ^ - Justices 
address "•_£••.-' * - 'n 
li.ocKruig^ i nited Slates, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), 
United States Supi em*- * ur L set torth the test to determine 
whether two offenses were sufficiently distinguishable to permit 
the imposition of cumulative punishment: 
The applicable rule is that where the same 
act or transaction constitutes a violation of 
two distinct statutory provisions,, the test 
to be applied to determine whether I there are 
two offenses or only one, is whether each 
provision requires proof of an additional 
fact which the other does not L 
Id. at 304. 
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 I • Whaleii \ I Inited States, 445 U S. 684 (1980), justice 
Blackmun, i i i I i is concurring opinion, stated:| 
Dicta in recent opinions of this Cour t a 1: 
least have suggested, and I now think 
wrongly, that the Double Jeopardy (piause may 
prevent the imposition of cumulative 
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980), that the Court took 
a significant step toward resolving the controversy. 
In Whalen, the Court took the opportunity to address 
the issue of Double Jeopardy in the cumulative punishment 
context, even though it was unnecessary to reach the Court's 
decision. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated: 
The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double 
jeopardy protects not only against a second 
trial for the same offense, but also "against 
multiple punishments for the same offense," 
North Carolina v. Pierce, supra, at 717, 89 
S.Ct., at 2076 (footnote omitted). But the 
question whether punishments imposed by a 
court after a defendant's conviction upon 
criminal charges are unconstitutionally 
multiple cannot be resolved without 
determining what punishments the Legislative 
Branch has authorized. 
The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double 
jeopardy embodies in this respect simply one 
Cont. punishments in situations in which 
the Legislative Branch clearly intended that 
multiple penalties be imposed for a single 
criminal transaction. See Simpson v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 6, 11-13, 98 S.Ct. 909, 912-
913, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978); Jeffers v. United 
States, 432 U.S. 137, 155, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 
2218, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977), (plurality 
opinion). I believe that the Court should 
take the opportunity presented by this case 
to repudiate those dicta squarely, and to 
hold clearly that the question of what 
punishments are constitutionally permissible 
is not different from the question of what 
punishments the Legislative Branch in tended 
to be imposed. I must concede that the dicta 
that seemingly support a contrary view have 
caused confusions among state courts that 
have attempted to decipher our pronouncements 
concerning the Double Jeopardy Clauses role 
in the area of multiple punishments. 
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 697-98. 
aspect of the basic principle Lhal witliin i ir 
federal constitutional framework the 
legislative power, including the power to 
define criminal offenses and to prescribe the 
punishments to be imposed upon thbse found 
gui 11y of them, resides who*1 1 y wi th the 
Congress. 
Id. *l emphases adde^N Importantly, following Whalen, the 
Court g r a n t s certiorari and vacated Mis sou,. .- ours , ViM, 
E ±^j±zJ^ J I0f"' remanding the 
cas ;. Hit- viSbviiii Supreme Court to z - \ eviewec in light 
Whalen, I: Sours, the defendan : ed guilty tu first degree 
r i dfiil tin armed criminal 
action A separate consecutive sentence was imposed for each 
count. In a collateral proceed]nq I In1 Mi-ssi'in i Supreme C'HJI! 
- sed del.en lant's conviction armed criminal action on the 
grounds that the convictions were * - th*.- same offense under the 
Blockburqer 
jeopardy. While . .- . pparen - Whalen 
attempted to resolve the controversy created in Simpson, i t i s 
a l s c if ipa r e i 1 t: x \\a 1. s01110 u it..nJ let> r wind i un,t u s e d , 
During its next term, in Albernaz v. United States , 450 
U.S, 333 {1961|, the Court, again attempted lo r i a n t y t hr ini 1 
' " I U U M P "ii**! "pa i ri11 • i • J .nisi' in p u M stamen t context 
The majority addressed the issue? even though a C M in i.t was 
unnecessary to reach the Court's decision. The rum l 
Last Term in Whalen v. United States, this 
Court stated that "the question whether 
."Jin i uinand in Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d,592 (Mo. 1980) 
( herein* f ier called Sours II) the Missouri Supreme Court upheJd 
their earlier ruling. The State's petition tor certiorari was 
thereafter denied. See Missouri v. Sours, 4 4Q TI •; i m (19 81) 
punishments imposed by a court after a 
defendant's conviction upon criminal charges 
are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be 
resolved without determining what punishments 
the Legislative Branch has authorized," . . . 
This is so because the "power to define 
criminal offenses and to prescribe 
punishments to be imposed upon those found 
guilty of them, resides wholly with the 
Congress." Ibid. As we previously noted in 
Brown v, Ohio, "[w]here consecutive sentences 
are imposed at a single criminal trial, the 
role of the constitutional guarantee is 
limited to assuring that the court does not 
exceed its legislative authorization by 
imposing multiple punishments for the same 
offense." 432 U.S., at 165,. Thus, the 
question of what punishments are 
constitutionally permissible is not different 
from the question of what punishments the 
Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. 
Where Congress intended, as it did here, to 
impose multiple punishments, imposition of 
such sentences does not violate the 
Constitution. 
Id. at 1145 (emphasis added). Following Albernaz, the Court 
again vacated a number of State Court decisions, which, despite 
Whalen, continued to find a double jeopardy violation for 
multiple punishment, even where there existed clear legislative 
19 intent. 
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Following Sours II, the Missouri Supreme Court began 
reversing convictions for armed criminal action in a number of 
cases. In nearly every case the State sought review by petition 
for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The 
Court in every case granted certiorari and vacated the decision 
in light of Albernaz. See e.g., Missouri v. Counselman, 603 
S.W.2d 709 (1980), vacated 450 U.S. 990 (1981); Missouri v. 
McGee, 602 S.W.2d 709 (1980), vacated 450 U.S. 990 (1981); 
Missouri v. Payne, 607 S.W.2d 822 (1980), vacated 450 U.S. 990 
(1981); Missouri v. White, 610 S.W.2d 646 (1980), vacated 450 
U.S. 990 (1981); Missouri v. Williams, 610 S.W.2d 644 (1980), 
vacated 450 U.S. 990 (1981). In addition to the Missouri 
decisions, the Court vacated two similar Delaware decisions. See 
Delaware v. Hunter, 420 A.2d 119 (1980), vacated 405 U.S. 991 
(1981); Delaware v. Evans, 420 A.2d 1186 (1980), vacated, 450 
U.S. 991 (1981). Notably, it appears that it was the continued 
refusal of the Missouri courts to conform to the Supreme Court 
Finally, in f.'cirly 1983, the Court unequi vocal 1 
disposed o f t h e i s s u e i n Mis sou i i J . hunter, 4 
Huntc-.. - s vei y is niu I .,1 r l.o the case at bar. In Hunter, the 
defendant was convicted and sentenced ten 1 irst-degree robbery, 
armed criminal v * •- ' »" "ii.i I i «•»« „ T l le Missouri 
Cui . set as- :t defenda i -ntence for armed 
criminal actic i^lieving that defendant v-c place'*:! in <1"iihl' 
jeopardy 4 ~ : ^  -.* • ; JL sry am J armed 
cr: . . c . . miction.- , * united States Supreme Court 
granted the -:a:e s petition * •'•":• aj.x ami fpyer sw1 Tin 
Cour L * »n »nrj Lentence tor both 
armed e m u i r . action and first degree : ' ^ ' f in a single trial 
did not violate thp Double Jeopardy H,' « IP "J Ji nq I In I '" 
M .leuptj, i ilj, I11 mi: w(j"i in.il. applicable, the Coin t specifically 
rejected the interpretation in earlier decisions I- * K> Missouri 
Supreme Court
 (l i n r i ud i nq M i s s o m i v. j o u i o , S "J J 
I •'•<' , v a c a t e d 'I'M l l!<ri | M'if(i | a n d Sour^s v . S t a t e , 6 0 3 
iS.W.lOJ VJxi j Mi i I 'Hi -f" i „ I hat S i m p s o n a n d o t h e r S u p r e m e C o u 
somehow established H i nn CI ause was violated 
wl'ii'i. i ii J J 'iiJbiii wai.» c o n v i c t e d a n d s e n t e n c e d u n d e r a f i r e a r m 
enhancement statute as we]I am MIP substantive underlying 
aggravated felon', Tl. ' 't.il l« I I 
[W]e need hardly go so far as suggested to 
decide that a legislature constitutionally 
can prescribe cumulative punishments for 
violation of its first-degree robbery statute 
and its arrnr-4 --iminal motion statute. 
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Cont , decisions in wnalen and Albernaz which later led the 
Court to unequivocally decide the issue in Missouri v. Hunter. 
Particularly in light of recent precedents of 
this Court, it is clear that the Missouri 
Supreme Court has misperceived the nature of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection 
against multiple punishments. With respect 
to cumulative sentences imposed in a single 
trialt the Double Jeopardy Clause does no 
more than prevent the sentencing court from 
prescribing greater punishment than the 
legislature intended. 
Our analysis and reasoning in Whalen and 
Albernaz lead inescapably to the conclusion 
that simply because two criminal statutes may 
be construed to proscribe the same conduct 
under the Blockburger test does not mean that 
the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the 
imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative 
punishments pursuant to those statutes. 
Where, as here, a legislature specifically 
authorizes cumulative punishment under two 
statutes, regardless of whether those two 
statutes proscribe the "same" conduct under 
Blockburger, a court's task of statutory 
construction is at an end and the prosecutor 
may seek and the trial court or jury may 
impose cumulative punishment under such 
statutes in a single trial. 
Id. 678-679 (emphasis added). Hunter cleared any lingering 
doubts as to the proper role of the Double Jeopardy Clause where 
there is clear legislative intent to provide cumulative 
punishment. Notably, following Huntery the States that have 
addressed the same or similar issue now raised by defendant have, 
without exception/ found no double jeopardy violation. See e.g.f 
State v. MullinS/ 517 N.E.2d 945 (Ohio App. 1986); State v. 
Elbert# 512 A.2d 1114 (N.H. 1986); Nevada Department of Prisons 
v. Bowen# 103 Nev. 477/ 745 P.2d 697 (1987); Jordan v. 
Commonwealth 
Sturgis. 4" State v. Trevino, 
I?;U) Ne* - .2d 503 (1988). 
The United States Supreme - •* 
COUT f l where there exists? c;ea: 
legislative intent support cumulative punishmer* uiiis 
case, higher pena & 
Je ^ exists clear legislative intent * impose 
the firearm enhancement provision, even :i n those cases where 
firearm, i s an element of t \v urviei J11, im| i-.ubfel.rintive f e l o n y 
offense See State v. Angus, SB I P.2d 992 (Utah 1978). 
Therefore, 1 mpositi 
instant case was 
Based 
"irearm enhancement 
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